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CHRISTOPHER ATWOOD

(Bloomington)
NATIONAL PARTY AND

LOCAL POLITICS IN ORDOS,
INNER MONGOLIA (1926-1935)
At the beginning of spring 1929, a lama was cremated in Üüshin
banner, on the Ordos plateau. After the fire burned out the attendants gathered the remnants of his bones and, mixing these sacred relics with earth, interred them in a small pagoda designed to hold the
remnants of holy men* An unridden horse was released on the steppe
for the liberation of the lama's soul, while the living monks held serv-

ices in the temple. Afterwards the monks were served tea and fed a
meal at the expense of the banner government; to sponsor such an
event was to earn merit for the whole community (Buyan et al. 1982:

396). Such state sponsored funerals for clerics took place often in
Mongolia, but what made this funeral different from others was that

the deceased had been not only a lama, but also the real ruler of his
banner for the last two and one-half years of his life, and that he had
ruled the banner not in the name of the Mongols' Yellow Church, but

in the name of his "Red Party" ( ula'an nam), the Inner Mongolian
People's Revolutionary Party.
The lama, named Öljeijirgal, had been active in the politics of his
banner since almost 1900 and had played a leading role in the organization of "circles" ( duguiiang ), which eventually became an alternate

focus of power within the banner. The duguiiang circles were so
called from their custom of sitting in a circle when they met, usually
at a Buddhist temple or sacrificial cairn ( obo'a ). When signing their

names they also signed them in a circle. By doing so no leader could

* I would like to thank David Faure and György Kara for reading drafts of this
paper and offering many valuable criticisms and suggestions.
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be singled out for punishment by the

started out as assemblies to petition the r

1900, the duguilangs began to arm them
until about 1915 in effect controlled m
forces. By this time the pretence of be

longer necessary, as the leaders relied on
selves, but the name persisted as did the
at cairns and temples.
Aided by Chinese troops, the ruling gra

ner, Tegiis-Amugulang, finally suppres

and imprisoned öljeijirgal. He later e

whence he returned five years later, not
with a party. With the aid of this "Red P

trol of the banner and revived the old
auspices. Despite what appeared to be st
ever, fitting the local duguilang circles

yond their own region, together with a p

lize all of Inner Mongolia proved to be
creased when the party center itself, w
result of the Nationalist alliance with t
lite Outer Mongolia) in the years 1923-

anti-Soviet factions. In the end, the dugu
closely with local society, that its final ab
vincial government in 1935 was an anti-cl

The Inner Mongolian People's Revolut
for all Inner Mongols and aspired to le
their limited horizons, to modernize In
the Mongolian children in secular, not
end it became identified with the local
raises many questions about the relati
aimed to reform a whole nation and its

mobilization which grew out of regional s

The Formation of the PRPIM

This "Red Party" began as the first vehicle of common political
activity by the Mongols of Inner Mongolia since the seventeenth cen-

tury. Having lost their independence to the Manchus in stages from
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1636 on, the Mongols were divided into banners ruled by a hereditary

nobility that had no power above them but the Beijing Court of Dependencies ( lijan yuan). In the late seventeenth century the Manchus
encouraged adjacent banners to organize themselves into Leagues;
the ruling nobles of the banners would choose the League head and
his deputy, subject to the approval of the Manchu Qing authorities.
At the same time, Governors General in Suiyuan, Chengde, Uliyasutai, Xining, and elsewhere, acquired regional power, standing between the leagues and banners, and their theoretical supervisor, the
Court of Dependencies in Beijing.
During the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the
leagues, which corresponded well to the native cultural areas of the
Mongols, continued to grow apart and develop distinctive literate
and folk cultures. In East Mongolia, the Mongols of Josotu, were influenced by the Confucian critique of Buddhism which had, by the
time of the Russo-Japanese war, become the scene of a movement of
modernization that took inspiration from the reforms of Meiji Japan

(Nacinbatu 1987). The four leagues of Khalkha in Outer Mongolia
came under the most profound Tibetan influence and, to a unique de-

gree, identified their nationhood with their great reincarnate lama,
the Jibdzündamba Khutugtu. The people of Ordos, south of the
great bend of the Yellow River, took the name of their league from
the bier of Chinggis Khan, which was fixed there, paid great respect
to the powerful ancestors of the Mongolian nation, along with the
Buddhist church.

Everywhere, except among the literate elite of East Mongolia and

among the Daurs of the Northeast, however, the Yellow Church
(shira shashin ) played a crucial role. Practiced by monks of the Dgelugs-pa order of Buddhism also dominant in Tibet, the Buddhist religion supplied an alternate locus of power and advancement to the
secular nobility, and at least potentially an alternative locus of political action. Only the Khalkha Mongols, however, took advantage of
this potentiality; in November 1911, as the Qing was busy coping
with rebellions in central China, the secular and clerical elite of the
Khalkhas, encouraged by St. Petersburg, implemented a plan that
had been discussed intermittently since 1900, and declared Khalkha
Mongolia an independent state. The new emperor was not one of the
nobles, descendants of Chinggis Khan, but rather the incarnate lama,
the eighth Jibdzündamba Khutugtu (r. 1874-1924), around whose
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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lineage as we noted, the Khalkhas ha

separateness since its appearance in the
The new state eventually foundered in
ular and the clerical elite, and by 1919,
the capital Khüriye. In response, memb

advisory parliament of Mongolia cre
Mongolian history, the Mongolian Pe
to seek aid from Soviet Russia to reence (Ewing 1980). When the Chines
autonomy in the Khölön Buir region

Railway, another party, the Khölön Bu

and like the People's Party, it too so

Both of these parties, however, were lo
to mobilize the whole Mongolian nati

defunct autonomous governments of
Buir.

In Outer Mongolia, the Red Army did intervene, but only after,
and because, the Chinese soldiers had been driven out by a White
Russian army. The re-establishment of an independent Mongolia,
this time as a constitutional monarchy, with real power not in the
hands of the Jibdzündamba Khutugtu, but rather in the hands of the

People's Party, however, exercised little immediate influence on Inner Mongolia. Several Inner Mongols from Urad and Bargu (including members of the Youth Party) banners on the border of Outer

Mongolia did go to the capital Neislel Khüriye (Russian "Urga") to
join in the building of the new state. Significantly, party construction

was still tied to a particular political organization, not a nation; neither the Khalkhas nor their Inner Mongolian acolytes made any attempt to extend the People's Party to Inner Mongolia. Rather those
Inner Mongolians who wished to join it had to travel to Neislel
Khüriye.
The organization of the first Mongolian party not connected with

a particular governmental structure came in 1924, under the influence of the Mongolian People's Party, but even more of the Chinese
Nationalists (in Mongolian, the party was named the Inner Mongoli-

an People's Party; in Chinese, the Inner Mongolian Nationalist Party). From the beginning the party represented the coalition of several
local movements each of which had members, for various reasons, liv-

ing in Beijing (Atwood 1990). In the leading position was a group of
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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East Mongolian, and more particularly Kharacin intellectuals who
had come to dominate the Mongolian educational apparatus set up
in Beijing around the Mongolian and Tibetan school. Led by Sereng
dongrub (a.k.a. Bai Yunti, 1894-1980), most of the members of thi
faction had already joined the KMT. Another clique consisted of th
old Youth Party from Khölön Buir. Most of its active members ha
followed Buyangerel (a.k.a. Fumingtai, b. 1894) to Khalkha after a
crackdown by the Heilongjiang military, but one leader, Merse
(a.k.a. Guo Daofu, 1894-1931?), had gone to Beijing, where he com
mitted his old party to join the new one. The third faction, and the

one most relevant to our purposes, was the duguilang activists wh
had arrived in Beijing as fugitives. The leading one, Bandid Gegeen
Wangdannima (1872-1926), was an incarnate lama, who - after extensive activity in Northern Ordos against land colonization by
Chinese, princely abuse of power, and in favor of the new Outer Mon-

golian state - had been captured in 1913 and sentenced to death by
the Governor General of Suiyuan. The Chinese President, Yuan Shikai, however, feared the effect of the execution of one who was not

only a popular leader, but also an incarnate lama, and the uncle of
the head of Yekhe Juu League, might have on the Chinese government's reputation in Mongolia. Yuan pardoned the cleric and even
arranged a sinecure for him as an advisor to the Prime Minister on
Mongolian affairs, but all on the condition that he not leave Beijing
(Baoyintu 1986: 40-41). In 1921, he was joined by the lama mentioned above, öljeijirgal (1866-1929), who was also known as Shinelama, or "New Lama". For their part, Shinelama and Wangdannima
committed the duguilang movement to the support of the new party
in 1924.

Under the Inner Mongols' situation of prolonged disunity, a party,
something that united people from different banners and leagues for

political action, was an unprecedented form of organization. The Inner Mongolian People's Party, the first party in Inner Mongolia,
united people from many different banners, who had in common only
the fact that they were living in Beijing and were dissatisfied with the

state of Inner Mongolia. However, the fact that the founders of the
party were living in Beijing did not necessarily mean they had cut off
ties from their local societies; indeed it was their presumed ability to
mobilize support in their homelands that made the party more than a
clique of expatriates. At the same time, by being in Beijing, the activJAH 26/1 (1992)
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ists (especially those who were fugitives
jeijirgal, and Merse), could not keep up r

region, due to the very poor state of comu

gions. When the party's central executiv

in summer of 1926, for example, it lost all
ical events and returned to Baotou two mon
start of the Nationalists' Northern Expedit

patron Feng Yuxiang from the Soviet Un
enabled these out of touch expatriates t
turned out - their hometown organizatio
only their high reputation in these move
ough immersion in the culture of that h
their instincts and responses did not app

of their hometown constituency.
The new party did attempt to homogenize
leaders, such as Serengdongrub, or Wangd

attracted to its cause. The leadership sel
the first class at the Nationalists' Huangp
them hailed from East Mongolia. At the
Mongols to the new Khalkha Mongolian s
öljeijirgal, who had been recommended t

dannima, and Rabdan, the son of a ruling d
On the way, öljeijirgal, who was more than
returned to his Üüshin banner and picked
lang activists, including his son Gungga, to

al. 1982: 249-253; Nozu 1986: 118). One y

though, that only capped off an entire chi
society, could not bring about a fundame
world view, a fact that became clear later o
During 1925, the party took a decisive movement leftwards. This
move had its source both in Mongolian and in Chinese politics. After

the last Jibdziindamba Khutugtu died in May 1924, the Mongolian
People's Party moved steadily leftwards and, by the end of 1924, had

abolished the monarchy and established the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR). The party was renamed the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP), and the capital's name changed from Neislel Khüriye ("Capital Court") to Ulaanbaatar Khota ("City of the
Red Hero"). The Inner Mongolian party followed their northern
brethren's lead and renamed their party the People's Revolutionary
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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Party of Inner Mongolia (PRPIM - in Chinese, the Inner Mongol
National Revolutionary Party). Meanwhile, after Feng Yuxiang,
dominated western and central Inner Mongolia, moved to accept
viet and Outer Mongolian aid, a three party alliance of the Natio
ists, the Chinese Communists, and the People's Revolutionary Party

of Inner Mongolia began to organize local party branches in Inner
Mongolia (Sheridan 1966: 163-176; Du and Wurijitu n.d.: 187). Militarily these branches received aid through the Feng's Guominjun or
"National Army", and indirectly through the Soviet Union and the
Mongolian People's Republic (Buyan et al. 1982: 251-252, 286;
Nozu 1986: 147-149). The cooperation with the Communists
brought a large group of Mongolian Communists, who were mostly
from the Tiimed Mongols, the most sinicized Mongols of all, but who

also included some from East Mongolia. Under the guidance of Li
Dazhao this group tried to absorb the Inner Mongolian Party and
put it under the leadership of the Chinese Communists but lacking
Soviet and Mongolian support, these efforts were unsuccessful (Du
and Wurijitu n. d.: 187; Nozu 1986: 152).
On October 10 1925, the party convened its first congress at
Zhangjiakou, the headquarters of Feng's military command (Atwood
1990: 103-134). The congress displayed an impressive degree of unity, considering the diversity of both the party itself and its sponsors.

The East Mongols, who were close to the KMT, dominated the presidium of the Central Committee, but two members of the Youth

party also were elected, öljeijirgal and Wangdannima were chosen
for the twenty-one man Central Committee, but not for the seven
man presidium. Serengdongrub was elected chairman. The program
adopted at the Congress may be summarized by its six-point over-all
program, passed on October 14:
1) Fully implement autonomy and self-determination for Inner
Mongolia.
2) Establish democratic rule.
3) Destroy Chinese warlord rule.
4) Abolish the feudal system.

5) Oppose the invasion and oppression of Inner Mongolia.
6) Purge the traitorous Mongolian princes and dukes (Nozu 1986:
121-122).

As can be seen, the demands at this time contained nothing that
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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contravened the spirit of the alliance between the Nationalists and

the Soviet Union (along with the MPR). In its more detailed program, the party envisioned establishing an autonomous government
for all of Inner Mongolia (meaning roughly the modern-day Inner
Mongolia Autonomous Region, plus the northern part of Qinghai
province, which also had a significant Mongolian population), with
its own army and an elected head. The banner princes and the
Chinese governors-general would have only limited power, but the
former office would still be hereditary (Nozu 1986: 121). Strikingly, in
view of this emphasis on creating a single government of Inner Mongolia, the Soviet documents on the party often refer to the party as

the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Government, not Party
(Nozu 1986: 147).

More particularly though, although both parties to the alliance
had their own ideologies (the Three People's Principle in one case,
and Marxism-Leninism in the other), the PRPIM members had

agreed to leave the matter of world view undetermined, even in its
manifesto. The documents of the Congress referred neither to any
"-ism", nor to any particular texts, such as Sim Yat-sen's lectures on
the Three People's Principles or the works of Lenin, that explained
how the party's practical actions were grounded in its understanding

of the course of world or even only Mongolian history. Neither the
Marxism of the Comintern, nor Lenin's doctrine of "non-capitalist

development" that became the MPRP's officially approved way of
applying Marxism to the Mongolian situation, nor the Three People's Principles of the Nationalists received any mention whatsoever.

The delegates also dispensed with any lengthy description of the
world situation, such as had been customary in the programs and
manifestos of the Mongolian People's (Revolutionary) Party from its
First Congress (Ewing 1980: 234). Thus by their silence, the delegates made it clear that the PRPIM was a practical organization,
dedicated to the creation of certain political and economic forms of
organization in Inner Mongolia, but that it did not offer any authoritative explanation of why, for example, the nobility was corrupt, or
why imperialists were encroaching on Inner Mongolia; members had
only to believe it was so, whatever their private reasons might be.
Thus it is no surprise that the party saw itself as an inclusive organization, bringing in any one who believed in the party program, rather
than an exclusive Leninist vanguard.
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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In practice, the party placed the greatest importance on establishing its own armed force. To get the aid of Feng Yuxiang, the leaders
agreed to put their force under the command of the Guominjun,
alongside two units of Chinese from Inner Mongolia, which would be
controlled by the Communists through a front organization (Nozu
1986: 147-148). They also pledged to participate in Feng's offensive
against Zhang Zuolin, for which they would have to wait until November 22, 1925, when Zhang's lieutenant Guo Songling would, according to plan, betray his master and go over to the Guominjun.
The other party leaders stayed in Zhangjiakou after the October
Congress, while Buyangerel, the former Youth Party member who
had fled to Khalkha in 1921 and was now on the presidium of the
PRPIM, went to Ulaanbaatar to arrange a shipment of rifles. When
Guo rebelled as planned, Murungga (a.k.a. Yue Jingtao, 1880/1885c. 1940) and other Central Committee members moved to Kheshigten banner, in the westernmost part of the Juu Uda league, itself on
the western limit of Zhang Zuolin's control. There, where Murungga's father was the de facto ruler of the banner, the party set up a
military academy and, starting with the Kheshigten banner's militia,
began collecting and training a military force; the force grew to
about six hundred poorly armed Mongolian cavalrymen in the first
week or so.

The method of participation of the PRPIM in this offensive
showed clearly what was to be the favored method of the party's mo-

bilization. The party preferred to bring over as units the local military forces and only worry about their ideological level later. Fast
growth in quantity took precedence over improving the quality of
forces, both in terms of ability to fight and in terms of ideological
commitment. Moreover, party leaders had to be assigned work not
by their special expertise, but by their native areas. The Comintern
agent assigned to the party, Aleksandr Ivanovich Ochirov, felt that
Murungga, son of an official in Kheshigten banner and standing
member of the Central Committee, was a diligent party worker, but

not as good a military leader as Sainbayar (a.k.a. Bao Yueqing,
1896-1939) from Khorchin. Even so, since the attack on Zhang
Zuolin was based in Kheshigten banner, Murungga had to lead the
party's battalion, while Sainbayar was sent to do underground party
work in Khorchin, which was occupied by Zhang's troops (Nozu
1986: 151-152).
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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As later proved usual for the party, initial s
was swift but lasting results few. The six hun

cruited in the Kheshigten base received abo
from the Mongolian People's Republic on N

about a week of training, set out against 1,50
son troops, who were of mixed Chinese and M

a month most of these troops had surrendered to the PRPIM's
forces, or fled, and the surrendered troops along with new recruits
from the local militias, brought the party's military force up to about

3,000. Also in taking three counties, Jingpeng, Linxi, and Wudan,
they had seized seven artillery pieces. Social measures were limited to
the torture and execution of several Chinese officials who had been

involved in land colonization projects sponsored by the government
(Nozu 1986: 148-149; Odkhonbilig 1981: 346-349).
These successes, however, left no permanent mark. Only twenty
party members had been assigned to officer the brigade and Ochirov
noted in his report: "Political work is very weak, the reason being
that there is no organization of political workers. Printed material is

extremely rare. The party central committee should urgently send
some pamphlets" (Nozu 1986: 150). When Zhang Zuolin defeated
Guo Songling and Feng's army retreated first to Beijing and then to
Nankou, the force built up in Inner Mongolia disintegrated as fast as
it came together. By January 1926, the PRPIM brigade headquarters had retreated west from Kheshigten to Dolonna'ur; of the forty
students who had been enrolled in the party's military academy, only
four showed up in the new location (Nozu 1986: 129). Since the party
had relied almost totally on military success, military failure meant it
left no underground organization or ideological influence whatsoever.

By August the party had followed the Guominjun's retreat to Baótou, the largest city in Western Inner Mongolia. Here, just north of
Ordos, the party began anew the process of building a local base that
could be the nucleus of a government. The failure in East Mongolia
weakened the influence of the Nationalist faction and strengthened
that of the Communists, but most importantly the decision to make
Ordos the new center of activity meant that Wangdannima, öljeijirgal, and the duguilang leaders would begin to play a major role.

JAH 26/1 (1992)

NATIONAL PARTY AND LOCAL POLITICS IN ORDOS 11

The PRPIM and the Ordos Duguilang Movement
Organizing the duguilang movement had begun shortly after the

debacle in East Mongolia. Öljeijirgal and Wangdannima had been

sent back to Ordos to begin organization early in 1926, and in February 1926, Öljeijirgal had organized seven party cells (e'iir, literally
"nests") at a grand meeting of 2,000 duguilang members at Gala'utu
Temple. But as the representatives of these cells met again at the
temple in March to elect a banner party committee, the grand duke
of Üüshin, Tegüs-Amugulang, sent another duguilang army, that he
had co-opted, to arrest them. Öljeijirgal escaped back to Baotou, and
he and Wangdannima asked duguilang organizations that they had
connections with to send young men to be trained in Baotou (Buyan
et al. 1982: 275 -282; Altan-Orgil 1989: 533-534). That summer, as
the Central Committee arrived at Baotou as well, the People's Revolutionary Army of Inner Mongolia (PRAIM) was officially established; as Ordos was Wangdannima's territory, he became the commander-in-chief.

In late August 1926, although Wangdannima had died in the meantime, the army was strong enough to march out and bully the recalci-

trant banner chiefs into allowing the PRPIM to freely arm and organize. A fair number of those trained in Kheshigten had eventually
made their way west to Baotou, where they were combined with the
recruits from Ordos. Receiving a new batch of several hundred repeating rifles and even a few machine-guns from the Mongolian People's Republic, as well as training from experienced Red Army and
Guominjun officers, the new force, small though it was, represented a
qualitative leap in military strength in the largely disarmed Ordos region. Aside from the Ordos forces, East Mongols who had studied in
Ulaanbaatar or at the academy in Kheshigten accompanied the expedition as a twenty-five man political department; this presumably
aided discipline and political awareness, although its results seem to
have been mixed. In Üüshin, Otog, and Khanggin banners previously
stubborn nobles became suddenly pliable as a far larger and better
equipped army than any banner head had ever commanded marched
through their territories. In Üüshin, Sainbayar, the CEC's special
representative brokered a trilateral agreement between the PRPIM
party center, the duguilangs (represented by öljeijirgal) and Grand
Duke Tegüs-Amugulang.
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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The eventual organization in Ordos bore
old duguilang organizations. The larger ba
gions each controlled by one duguilang m
seem to have been groups of interested lo
unteered to perform military and political
banner government was not performing
langs ruled the banner until 1921, when
Tegüs-Amugulang, crushed the moveme
gal with the aid of troops of a county com
province. In Otog, eight duguilangs had a
putes between them eventually caused the
government (Liu 1984: 167-168; Buyan et al. 1982: 257-260). In
Üüshin, however, the duguilangs had elected representatives to assemble at Gala'utu Temple as a Gonghui (Mong. olan-u jöblel, although Mongolian documents often use the Chinese term as well), or
"public council" that decided major issues (Altan-Orgil 1989: 538539).
When the duguilangs were revived by the party, the latter's organization by cells fell into this same pattern. The original seven cells
were expanded to seventeen, and the Public Council was in name revived in the form of trilateral conferences between the old banner of-

ficials, the party representatives from each cell, and the army. The
resolutions of these conferences, though, were addressed directly to
the party cells. The party cells, thus, were not the hidden backbone of
other public organizations; rather, they were the basic organs of administration, a group of interested supporters of the new regime who
shouldered administrative tasks on its behalf in a given region. Thus,
the cells were assigned specific numbers of students to supply to the

new schools, specific numbers of trees to plant in sandy areas, and
contributions to the military (Altan-Orgil 1989: 528-531). In a telling mistake, one party document stated that after Öljeijirgal's assassination, the party cells were increased from twelve to nineteen (Altan-Orgil 1989: 540), when actually, as elsewhere stated, the number
at Öljeijirgal's death was seventeen (Altan-Orgil 1989: 535); clearly
the author had confused the seventeen party cells with the old twelve
duguilangs of Üüshin.

Real power in Üüshin lay more in the hands of the army than of
the party. Öljeijirgal never held the position of chairman of the party

committee which went to Tümenjirgal, or secretary general which
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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went to Sodnamdongrub (b. 1875); instead he was commander ( tuan
zhang) of the PRAIM's twelfth regiment (tuan), which was the formal name of the Üüshin army (Buyan et al. 1982: 276; Altan-Orgil
1989: 534). After one of the Üüshin soldiers, allegedly conspiring with
the nearby Chinese county commander Jing Yuexiu, shot öljeijirgal
in his sleep on Lunar New Year's Day 1929, neither of the party leaders succeeded him, but Möngkhe-Öljei, the deputy commander or
tuanfu of Öljeijirgal's Twelfth Regiment (Buyan et al. 1982: 321322, 401). Eventually Möngkhe-Öljei elevated himself to chairman of
the Public Council and promoted his deputy Kheshigdalai to commander of the army; the old party chiefs Tiimenjirgal and Sodnamdongrub were replaced by Arbinbayar, a former military commander
(Buyan et al. 1982: 417).
This army differed from other local forces by being much larger as
well as better armed; late in 1926, the party center had provided
them with more than a hundred "pearl-string" ( lianzhu ), or repeat
ing rifles, and once having been armed they were able to capture
more weapons from their enemies. Before the arrival of Öljeijirgal,
the total banner army was less than thirty men. After the arrival of
the PRAIM and the signing of the trilateral agreement in summer
1926, the party leaders left behind with Öljeijirgal one political commissar, Lhunrub, Wangdannima's former secretary, and Jirgal from
Kheshigten banner, as the staff officer (Buyan et al. 1982: 348).
These two "foreigners", along with the volunteers who had been
trained in Baotou in spring-summer 1926, constituted the core of the
new army. With recruitment in Üüshin banner, this core soon expanded to more than one hundred, and later reached a peak at almost
one hundred fifty (Odkhonbilig 1981: 353; Altan-Orgil 1989: 543,
549). The volunteer nature of this force marked a large difference
from the regular banner armies which were filled as a state obligation
on a rotating basis. The volunteer army was seen as very threatening
by the old banner elite; it was thought to be more likely to intervene
in political issues than a randomly picked, draft force. Thus, after old
party organizations were abolished by the Suiyuan governors office
in 1935, and the old institutions revived, special attention was paid to
making sure the militia would not accept volunteers and that the
army would not involve itself in quarrels (Altan-Orgil 1989: 552553).
Another feature of the military organization that diverged from
JAH 26/1 (1992)
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orthodox practice was the recruitment o
the army, Öljeijirgal, was himself a lama.
tions specifically provided that those lam
monasteries and not celibate (usually the
golia) would be drafted as army doctors
league head demonstrated against allowin

the new regulations issued in 1935 specifica
1989: 522, 553).

Ideologically the party had to deal with
Mongolian people to any idea or institution associated with the
Republican revolution of 1911. Educated writers, especially when
appealing to Chinese authorities, tried to win them over by a wealth
of Confucian allusions which overtly suggested that a true Republican government would fulfill the old promise of Yao and Shun, but
also implied that the writers viewed the republic as an essentially
Chinese form of government. One petition from a duguilang group in
1921, pleads in its preface: "According to the heavenly rule of the early Yao and Shun . . . bring the situation back into harmony with the

all embracing rules of the Three Bonds and the Five Constant Virtues . . ." (Serruys 1978: 14). No duguilang document from the Qing
has such heavy Confucian imagery, not even those written five or ten
years earlier. A common argument compared the convoking of a par-

liament to the gathering of scholars that marked a just reign; thus
one Ordos poet writing around 1915 wrote:

All of them, Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian, Muslim, and Tibetan
Are clearly the five large races of this time.

The Monarchy will disintegrate and a party assembly be called
So that a people's rule that respects the learned may be founded
(Sainjirgal and Sharaldai 1984: 113, cf. 8).
By the same token, others attacked the system of hereditary nobility
in the name of these Confucian-Republican principles:
We beg General Hsü to consider that the ruling princes of the banners not only were not educated to rule the nation, but, because of
their hereditary position, unjustly oppress the loyal common people who lead an ordinary life. The ruling princes levy illegal taxes,

break with virtue and ignore righteousness. They alienate the
scholars, and associate with the flatterers. They forget the three
principles and the five constant virtues. They think only of pleasJAH 26/1 (1992)
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ure. This does not suit present needs. It would be a good idea to
abolish the hereditary ruling princes, to dismiss the uneducated
and stupid ruling princes and to hold elections as do other nations
in the world (Onon 1976: 158-159).
Those friendly to the hereditary principle warned that under the Republic the nobles would have to be extra careful if they hoped to keep
their thrones.

In the Mongolian banners and leagues of the many outer provinces,
The decrees of the sovereign dukes and lords are held as highest.
Consider the revolution and the present day so hostile to this principle

And deign to help all the Mongolian lineage (Sainjirgal and Sharaldai 1984: 114).

The people, though, held an aversion to the whole idea of a republic regardless of its Confucian or anti-Confucian message. In popular terms this aversion settled on a few concepts that aroused disgust. Gaming, the Mongolian pronunciation of Chinese geming, "revolution", as well as its Mongolian caique translation, boshug-i
khalakhu meaning "changing the mandate", had become more or less
synonymous with bandit, while irgen ulus, the approved Mongolian
translation of minguo, or "republic" suffered from also meaning
"Chinese country" ( irgen in Mongolian meant both "subject" and
"Chinese"). The idea of a republic had become associated very
strongly with the idea of Chinese ethnicity; for most of the rural
Mongols, this meant it was basically unacceptable.
As the Mongols, unlike the Chinese, had not cut off their queues,
this also served as a symbol to focus popular feeling on the republic
as foreign. In 1926, one opponent of öljeijirgal's duguilang regime
cut off his queue to express his loyalty to the Chinese warlord Jing
Yuexiu in Yulin, just south of Üüshin. On returning to the banner, the
locals mocked him in song:
The five ministers, and ten colonels

Have lived in vain it seems [i.e. the regular banner offices have
been superseded]
Tumi Dandar, holding fifty soldiers

Has gone quite bald it seems
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Even though the morals of
The soldiers of the Zhonghua Minguo spre
Are not the six rulers and the seven banner
All caught up in a trap?
As the unprincipled flatterers
Become ever more,
Do they not harass

Us righteous many folk? (Buyan et al. 198

Note that the name of the Republic of Ch

{zhonghua minguo); this clearly expressed the
ty of republican institutions.
The problem for the Mongolian revolutionar
supported looked essentially like the gainings
the fall of 1921, some hot-heads in the Revol
lakhu) Youth League had created a great fu

and banning women's head ornaments (Lhamsüren 1984: 93-94;
Onon 1976: 185). These measures were hastily revoked, and the Mongolian People's Party tried to solve at least some of the semantic
issues. They began to translate "revolution" as khubiskhal, a word
which actually suggested "metamorphosis", and "republic" by
bügüde nairamdakhu ulus, a caique translation of Chinese gongheguo,
an alternate term for Republic. But even thus renamed, the Mongols
in Ordos retained a lingering distrust of republican institutions and

ideas. Further distrust focused on the anti-religious policy of the
Comintern sponsors of the party. At the first Ordos party branch
congress, one delegate asked: "They say that the Outer Mongols under the Communist rule have abolished religion. Is this true?" (Nozu
1986: 137). No answer to this question is recorded although the Central Committee representatives surely denied it (at the time it was
not true, although by the 1930s it would be). Although the PRPIM
propaganda did not make much of it, their red star and red flag sym-

bolized republican goals: "Let us cover the whole orb of the world/
with our red republican ( bügüde nairamdakhu ) flag" ran the lyrics to
one party song, sung to the tune of the "Internationale" ( Ediinkheshig,

et al. 1981: 387). But if they avoided these touchy cultural issues,
then they left the party with very little that, on a local level, distinguished it from simple duguilang movements.
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Even those sixteen Ordos men, who went with Öljeijirgal to Ulaa
baatar in 1924, showed little interest in abstract ideological disput
The behavior of the duguilang leaders in ideological disputes with
the party's Central Committee was almost entirely passive. As t
party was being torn apart by the split between the pro-Soviet a
the pro-Nationalist factions, the Ordos leaders, as the representatives
of the major grass-roots movement, were often called upon to g
their support to one or the other line. Möngkhe-Öljei, Öljeijirga
leading lieutenant, Jamiyangshirab (a.k.a. Zhang Wenxian, 18971946), another incarnate lama and the duguilang leader of Otog ba
ner, Rabdan (a.k.a. Qi Zi jun, 1901-1932), the son of the duke of
Je'üngar banner and chairman of the PRPIM's Ordos committee
and other duguilang activists first participated in an emergency conference in Feng's new headquarters, Ningxia. Serengdongrub, th
leading pro-Nationalist and chairman of the Central Committee
called the conference in July 1927, largely to suspend his enem
Merse and to pass rules that would prevent the Comintern from
packing the forthcoming expanded emergency conference in Ulaa
baatar, scheduled for one month later. The Ordos representativ
passed the required motions and Serengdongrub demanded what
thought were his obedient tools follow him to that conference. Whil
there, however, they were captured by the Comintern representativ
Amugayev, who got an almost entirely new left-wing Central Com
mittee elected - Möngkhe-Öljei even ended up replacing Serengdo
grub as the new chairman of the Central Committee! Serengdongr
escaped to Inner Mongolia and managed to keep control of the arm
and organs of the party in Ningxia. The chairman Möngkhe-Ölj
Jamiyangshirab, and the other Ordos delegates, their usefulness
the Comintern over, spent the next few months sitting in their hot
reading the works of Marx and Lenin (Liu 1984: 169-170).
Nor did this study have any markedly positive effect on their poli
ical vigor. By winter, they requested to return home and were
lowed to do so, apparently only after surrendering their new digniti
as Central Committee members. They apparently travelled straig
to Ningxia where Serengdongrub's East Mongolian supporters
promptly threw them in jail. The duguilang leaders only escaped
thanks to the intervention of their Ordos compatriot, Rabdan, who
had been neutral in the Nationalist-Comintern dispute but had very
good personal connections with Feng Yuxiang. Upon returning, JaJAH 26/1 (1992)
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miyangshirab quickly re-established his posit

of Otog banner, but held a lasting grudge
with the PRPIM, regardless of faction. M
Ordos, and there is no indication that öljei
heroic venture into national party politics
local leadership; he stayed on as second in c
jirgal's assassination took over the leadershi
Öljeijirgal himself, who in modern Inner

ways portrayed as a staunch supporter of the

in compromising with the Nationalists. In
Danshan: 1892-1945), from East Mongolia and a pro-Nationalist,
appeared in Üüshin with the force directly under Serengdongrub's
anti-Comintern party center, informed the Üüshin army that they
could no longer do whatever they wanted, but had to take orders
from the Nationalists. As a token of this submission the soldiers

would have to replace the five-pointed red star on their shoulders

with the Nationalists' white sun on blue sky. Öljeijirgal and his duguilang supporters had no intention of following this advice, but their
reasoning showed that they also had no wish to take a national, ideological stand. One, Saishingga, reacted angrily to Mandaltu's demand:
"We've done more than enough work. With so many men and horses,
how can we listen to him tell us we can't run our own affairs and have

to submit to the Guomindang? This is impossible!" öljeijirgal made
no open resistance but privately calmed his subordinates: "We
mustn't surrender to the Guomindang. Let them go their way, we'll
go ours" (Buyan et al. 1982: 365-367). A 1930 letter from Üüshin
summarizing the party branch's history painted the struggle as one
of right versus left, but this very document was written in an effort to

persuade the left-wing Central Committee in Ulaanbaatar to give aid
(Altan-Orgil 1989: 535). At the time, the Üüshin men, angry or not,
viewed the demand to take on the Nationalist colors not as an ideo-

logical abomination, but as a threat to their local autonomy. Even-

tually Öljeijirgal proposed a compromise; those who wished to
change their shoulder ornaments could, those who didn't need not
change them. As for himself, he said, he had always worn a Mongolian
robe with no emblems at all, so there was no point in putting one on
now. The red star and the white sun co-existed nervously in Üüshin,
until Mandaltu's army received orders from Serengdongrub to bring

öljeijirgal back to Ningxia by any means possible. In the attempt to
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carry this out, the two armies clashed, and the pro-KMT army fled
back to Ningxia in defeat.
The main cultural issue on which the revolutionaries had to pre-

varicate in the face of overwhelming opposition was religion. As we
have seen above, the association with the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic made many Mongols instinctively suspect
an anti-religious bias in the party. The CEC, dominated by Nationalist East Mongols, adopted a policy by which "both the yellow (clerical) and black (lay) feudalists" ( khara shira ilgal ügei ) could join, if
they sincerely supported the aims of the party. In their popular prop-

aganda, the party not only did not criticize Buddhism, but actively
advocated it. Party songs followed the call to raise the red flag, with a

parallel one to raise the yellow flag (Ediinkheshig, et al. 1981: 384).
One song issued by the CEC even suggested that it was this people's
party which would finally bring the Daurs and Solon Ewenkis into
the faith. Many Mongols viewed these groups as not quite Mongolian, because they had never adopted Buddhism. The party could establish the intra-Mongolian unity necessary to victory by bringing
them into the church (Edünkheshig, et al. 1981: 384-385; Jagchid
and Hyer 1979: 141-142). After the break-up of the party, Merse,
himself a Daur, and probably not a believer, felt that as the unity of
Khalkha had come from the common devotion to the Jibdziindamba

Khutugtu, so Inner Mongolian leaders could use the Panchen Lama
as a focus of Inner Mongolian unity (Taobuxin 1984: 7-8).
In this context, it may not seem strange that Öljeijirgal's marching
song began with the following two stanzas:
Let us raise the red flag high
And make the great nation flourish.
Let us reduce to ashes

The rebellious thieving enemy.
Let us raise the yellow flag high
And make the church's strength flourish
Lay (khara) and clerical (shira) together,
Let us crush the anarchic enemy ( Altan-Orgil 1989: 516-517).

In fact, this song had been first composed in 1921 during the Outer
Mongolian revolution, where gaining the support of the clergy, espe-

cially of the Jibdziindamba Khutugtu, was crucial. Such sentiments,
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though, meant one thing when expressed b
whose intellectual leadership was raised in a climate of academic
anti-clericalism, and quite another when being propounded by Ordos
leaders who were themselves lamas. For them this was by no means a
pose adopted to calm the suspicious herdsmen, but a sincere belief.

Moreover, the evolution of the duguilang movement previous to
the coming of the PRPIM had revealed a particularly sharp tension,
not between the nobles and the high lamas on the one hand ("the
black and yellow feudalists" in the contemporary leftish jargon) and
the people on the other, but between the nobles and the high lamas
themselves. The Comintern representative, Ochirov, viewed this con-

flict as the consequence of land colonization from 1900 on: Chinese
colonization made the nobles wealthy because many of them continued to hold bottom soil rights, upon which they collected rents, but
impoverished the monks, because the monastic treasuries were mostly

held as herds, which colonization hurt. Moreover, as the Mongols
were driven out, the lamas lost the income that they used to get from

performing services for the local population (Nozu 1986: 135). This
analysis may be to some extent correct, although even in areas and
times when colonization was not an issue, disputes between ruling nobles and lamas often broke out over other matters. In Khanggin banner, for example, the grand duke Altan-Ochir had been selected as an
incarnate lama in his youth. His father had demanded that this his
only son be allowed to grow up outside the monastery and succeed
him as prince. When the young incarnate grand duke reached the
throne, he delighted in wearing clerical robes and performing Buddhist services. Eventually, he had a great temple built near his residence and forced the lamas of the banner to perform services there in
rotation, under his direction. In 1921, the lamas of Shira Juu revolted
and, led by the monks, appealed to the League head, who rendered
the following decision to the grand duke: "Not only may you continue as ruler of the banner, you may control Beile-yin Juu [the new
temple] all by yourself, but you may not interfere in any other temple's affairs" (Buyan, et al. 1982: 261-266). Other examples of rulers
defeated in their attempts to centralize religious power in their own
hands can be found in Khalkha (see Onon 1976: 5-7); the theocratic
government of Outer Mongolia fell largely because of the nobility's
resentment against clerical control.
In this situation of polarization, the party center in Baotou usually
JAH26/1 (1992)
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ended up as a captive of local interests, supplying weapons to, a
dispatching its central army for the support of whichever local e

ment it saw as most sympathetic. Calling to raise the yellow flag hig

amounted to standing on the clergy's side in issues which, while e

tirely peripheral to the party's stated concerns, were very important

to the politically active segment of the Ordos people. In Khanggi
banner mentioned above, the duguilang movement of monks remained in existence after its victory and in 1926 allied with the
PRPIM. Thus the PRPIM organization in Khanggin ended up
largely restricted to Shira Juu monastery. The grand duke AltanOchir temporized, but in the meanwhile a lay duguilang movement
had sprung up over the banner government's imposition of a new fee
on the collection of salt from one of the banner's salt lakes, and the
grand duke's refusal to consult with the local officials. Seeing an opportunity, Altan-Ochir revoked the new fee, promised to be less auto-

cratic in the future, and designated the lay duguilang group as a
"peace preservation militia" ( baoweituan ). Although this lay duguilang movement had made contact with the monastic duguilang and
the IMPRP, in the end it backed the grand duke and in spring 1927,
he used its militia to arrest the lamas and crush the PRPIM cells in

his banner (Buyan et al. 1982: 299-312).
In Je'üngar banner, however, the party ended up in opposition to
the clerical power. Rabdan, one of the younger sons of the ruling
duke, had joined Feng Yuxiang's army in 1924, studied in Ulaanbaatar, and attended the first congress of the PRPIM. When he returned

to his banner in summer 1926, he immediately began to implement
modernizing reforms by decree. The rights of the hereditary gentry
( taiji ) were abolished; the bottom soil rights of the banner government over the Chinese peasants, along with the rights of the banner

government to rent further land, were abolished. Most shockingly
though, he established secular schools, burned the sutras he had studied in school to illustrate the impotence of blind faith, and cut off the

Mongols' queues. The latter measure especially enraged the banner
subjects who complained: "If you cut off our queues, we'll be the
most ugly, ridiculous things, neither male nor female, neither clerical
nor lay" (Buyan et al. 1982: 294-295). Rabdan's father, who feared
that new schools were just a way station on the route to abolition of
hereditary privilege, steered him rather into an expedition to settle a
territorial dispute with a neighboring Shanxi county. Unfortunately
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Yan Xishan, the Shanxi warlord, saw this at

expand in Suiyuan at the expense of Feng
Je'iingar, while Rabdan, with no suppor
Ningxia, where Feng's new headquarters
1926. As the Mongolian People's Party fou
sues, whose solution formed a constant t

revolutionary, were also the most perilous.
On the issue of local separatism, the party

its own view on the local populations. So
center stressed unity of all the Mongols
connections between leagues and banners"
"The Song of All Inner Mongolia" empha

Party's red flag could, by making the weak

ward Qinghai advanced, unite all the Inne
al. 1981: 385-388). But they had much res

lot of it inspired by the fact that the Centr

represent the Mongols as a whole. Of th
standing committee, five were East Mon
other a Bargu. Much tension arose from
of the East Mongols towards the Ordos h
This dominance of East Mongols and espe
banners in Inner Mongolia-wide organiz
forties (indeed it still creates resentmen

many stories expressing the resentment of

a Mongol decides to commit suicide becau
occupied by Kharachins, and throws him
discovers another Mongol has already ju
the well - he too is a Kharachin ( Jagchid
political department of the force that en
ferred to as the "Central Committee's Kh
1982: 301). Thus, the party center's pleas

fell on deaf ears; they sounded too self-int

The party center was aware of the tend

the organization, but having armed the dug
ing to control them without risking an arm

Central Committee in spring 1927, deta
occupied himself with local affairs and did

connections with other banners, even at

promising state of affairs in Otog, Khangg
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bordering banners was being reversed. Blinded by the love of power
and ruling his banner dictatorially, he had no desire to dissipate his
forces by intervening to help the revolution, the report said (Buyan
et al. 1982: 354-355). In the summer of 1927, Serengdongrub invited
öljeijirgal to his emergency conference in Ningxia, but, as we have
seen, öljeijirgal sent his deputy Möngkhe-Öljei and others, rather
than go himself; having returned to his banner in fall 1926, öljeijirgal
never again left Üiishin. Serengdongrub had no way to force Öljeijirgal to attend.
Even within Ordos, disputes between banners occurred frequently,
and, in the prevailing land shortage stemming from Chinese colonization, centered on tracts of disputed territory, as well as refugees from

one banner to the next. In 1906-1907, Wangdannima, for example,
earned the hatred of the Üüshin duguilang movements for encouraging the prince of Jiyün Wang, over whom the lama had great influence, to seize a tract of disputed territory and settle it with refugees

from Wangdannima's own banner, which had been hard hit by colonization (Serruys 1977: 497, 502-503). Similarly, Üüshin and Otog
banner had a long standing land dispute that often heated up during
times of popular agitation (Serruys 1977: 492, Serruys 1978: 2-3).
Many refugees from Jasag banner crowded in Üüshin and, presumably due to the hostility of the native-born duguilang activists, eventually formed a large part of the army that the warlord Jing Yuexiu

used to raid Üüshin banner (Serruys 1977: 486; Buyan et al. 1982:
338).
Although the party held several special conferences for work in Ordos and neighboring leagues, they rarely if ever dealt with specific action in the various leagues. Instead, they usually ended up as vehicles
for the pursuit of one or another national program. Thus the first

PRPIM sponsored conference of duguilangs in Ordos (summer,
1926) served to introduce them to the PRPIM and its policy; the second in July 1927, mostly served, as noted above, to criticize Merse
and to try to prevent the Comintern from packing the Expanded
Conference planned for August of that year. The last, held in March
1930, was called by the Comintern to announce its new pan-Mongolist line, that advocated not autonomy, as before, but complete independence for Inner Mongolia. Thus, the party organization never became a vehicle for the resolution of long-standing local feuds; instead,
the local party branches were captured by them.
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The Decline of the Üüshin Party

Under these conditions the Üüshin party

normalize its position with regard to the larg
jirgal began this process after his clash with

army. Since the Inner Mongolian People's R
soon after disarmed and reconstituted as p
Guominjun, it became somewhat anachroni
the Üüshin army the twelfth regiment of

tantly, to continue holding the flag of an org
aspired to be national in scope, but which had now been dissolved,
was a standing invitation for outside powers to intervene and rectify
the anomalous situation.

In fall 1928, Öljeijirgal took the opportunity of a party conference
to rename his army the "Army of Üüshin Banner" (Buyan et al. 1982:
376-377). Whereas national connections for a rebellious banner were

highly advantageous in a time when revolution was everywhere and
being materially supported with arms, they were very dangerous

when the new Nationalist government was proclaiming law and order. At the same time he renamed the party "cells" as "villages" (gaca'a ). The party described this change as going secret, but the sort of
secrecy implied was different from that used in underground party
work. What became secret was not the existence of the cells them-

selves - after all they did most of the administrative work of the banner - but that these local administrative organs were actually cells of
a party that claimed national significance. Once again since the revolutionary organs already functioned much like the traditional dugui-

lang organizations, simply renaming them did make them look, at
least from a distance, like fairly unthreatening local militia.

Further normalization took place after öljeijirgal's death. In
spring 1929, Möngkhe-Öljei gave his Üüshin army a pompous

Chinese title "The Pacification and Garrison Cavalry of Üüshin Banner" ( Wushen qi xunfang qibing) and, more significantly, informed the
league head of this move, thus implicitly recognizing its authority
(Buyan, et al. 1982: 410-402). He also brought to an end the long
standing guerilla war that had droned on between the Üüshin banner

and the Chinese warlord in Yulin, Jing Yuexiu since the winter of
1926-1927. Although the Üüshin forces were generally victorious
and able to keep Jing's raiding parties out of the heart of Üüshin, the
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hostilities had interrupted trade between the two areas causing hardship to Mongol and Chinese border traders. Thus, with the latter acting as an intermediary, an agreement was signed that enabled the two
sides to resume the mutually necessary trade.

The main obstacle to normalization, though, lay in the fact that
the prince had at the beginning of the hostilities fled from house
arrest to Yulin, in Shaanxi. Until Üüshin had a ruling noble, it was
not a normal banner; it would still be seen as being in the hands of a

rebellious illegal gang. Now with his previous supporter, the little
warlord Jing, making peace, Grand Duke T egüs- Amugulang had to
travel, along with an armed escort of more than thirty men, to the
head of the league, then the prince of Jasag banner, to plead his case.
Möngkhe-Öljei sent a delegation of men led by the political commis-

sar of the Üüshin army Lhunrub to persuade or compel him to return. Only the latter course proved feasible, and the revolutionaries
kidnapped the prince and most of his escort, butchering the latter on

the way back to the banner. Thus in fall 1929, when commissioners
from the Suiyuan provincial government came to investigate, they
concluded that in this banner, as in many others, the prince was not
competent to rule and the best step was simply to legitimize the ex-

isting militia heads. The same policy was followed in Otog with the
ex-IMPRP member the incarnate lama Jamiyangshirab; although he
had broken with the PRPIM, he kept the rifles and established a
twenty year rule over Otog banner. The Suiyuan provincial government had no alternative but to declare that the princes were so lazy,

immoral and generally unfit to rule that they needed official assistants. It, thus, bestowed on both Jamiyangshirab and Möngkhe-Öljei
the title "Assistant Director for Banner Affairs" and hereafter dealt

with them instead of their figurehead princes (Buyan et al. 1982,
405-412; Liu 1984: 171-172).
The normalization of the banner was complete; the one-time revolutionaries had become simply another local militia needing to be given recognition by the provincial government. Just at this time, how-

ever, the party also revived its ties with the new left-wing Central
Committee in Ulaanbaatar set up by the Comintern after the Emergency Conference of August, 1927. When Öljeijirgal was assassinated,
Möngkhe-Öljei informed Ulaanbaatar of this setback, as well as the
changing of cells into "villages". In fall 1929, the party center in
Ulaanbaatar followed the more aggressive line of the Comintern inJAH 26/1 (1992)
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ternationally and sent secret representati
that Inner Mongolia should now demand independence. The encroachments of the Northeast Chinese warlord, Zhang Xueliang, on
Soviet rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway, provoked the Soviet
Union into encouraging any form of uprising and riots against the
Nanjing government (Lee 1983: 95-126). In Inner Mongolia this
meant supporting immediate rebellion and secession from the
"Chinese imperialists" (Odkhonbilig 1981: 379; Edünkheshig et al.
1981: 343-371). The new line did not impede the process of reintegrating Üüshin into the league and provincial framework, and as an
unexpected byproduct, perhaps, Üüshin became a safer area for party work. The next and last party conference of the PRPIM held in
Inner Mongolia on March 17, 1930, opened in this not openly rebellious, but in effect self-policing banner (Buyan et al. 1982: 413-416;
Altan-Orgil 1989: 136-137).
The most likely reason why the Üüshin government was eager to
expand relations with the Comintern simultaneously with the existing government of Suiyuan was military and economic necessity. The

reintegration with the surrounding administrations had helped the
economic situation, although as a letter sent in March 1930, to the
Central Committee confessed, even with the bottom rent, and "grass
tax" on Chinese farms and herds, and lacking any special natural resources, the revenues always fell short of expenditures (Altan-Orgil
1989: 542-543). The real shortage lay in guns, of which the four companies had no more than twelve to twenty each, down from a maximum total of one hundred forty. The letter concluded with a plea for
guns and ammunition and hinted that Üüshin could serve as a base
for helping the revolution along in other banners (Altan-Orgil 1989:
549-550). Thus, the desire to maintain ties with the party center, at
a time when the banner leadership had already largely transformed
itself into a local militia organization, seems to have stemmed from
the need to obtain weapons for what was, in its area, an unusually
large military establishment.
The aggressive line of the Comintern lasted for about two years.
Following the utter failure of anti-Nationalist uprisings in Northeast
China, of the "Li Lisan line" in southern China, and the inability of
the Inner Mongolian party to foment any significant uprisings at all,
the remaining PRPIM organizations in western Inner Mongolia
were pushed to merge with the Chinese Communist party in SeptemJAH 26/1 (1992)
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ber 1931 (Du and Wurijitu, n.d.: 208-210). Just about this time,
however, the Üüshin party cells were losing touch with the Comintern. Previously, contact between Üüshin and Ulaanbaatar had been
through underground Tiimed Mongolian cells, which in turn connected with Üüshin via Rabdan, the Je'üngar ruler's son, who had returned to his home banner in 1928. When Rabdan was murdered in a

personal quarrel in early 1932, Üüshin banner's weakening ties with
the conspiratorial network of revolutionary parties were finally cut.

The final end of the Public Council government in Üüshin happened through an appropriately confused set of local and ideological
factors. There seems to have been a power conflict in March 1930,
which eventually ousted Sodnamdongrub from the party secretaryship, which he had held since February 1926; some sources suggest it
sprang from Sodnamdongrub's disagreement with Möngkhe-Öljei's
insufficiently pure revolutionary policies (Odkhonbilig 1981: 404405). Be that as it may, Möngkhe-Öljei remained in control of Üüshin

until 1935. In that year Galzangrulmawangjiljamsu, prince of Otog
banner, became the head of the league, which meant that in effect Jamiyangshirab, his "Assistant Director of Banner Affairs", became the
pre-eminent Mongol in Ordos. Apparently, both to settle to his satisfaction Otog banner's long-standing territorial conflict with Üüshin

and to satisfy his own hatred of the PRPIM, Jamiyangshirab had
Prince Ga (as his name was abbreviated) petition Suiyuan province
for an investigation of the irregularities in Üüshin banner. This time
there was to be no escape for the Public Council government; the en-

suing report connected the whole organization - villages, council,
and militia - to the "Red Party", abolished them all, revived all the
old powers of the prince, and after sending Möngkhe-Öljei to worship
at Chinggis Khan's bier in Jasag banner, stripped him of all his posts

(Buyan et al. 1982: 418-421). He along with two old company heads
moved to Khanggin banner; when the company heads returned to
their hometowns, they escaped detection for a year but were eventually caught and executed by the agents of the Grand Duke TegiisAmugulang. Möngkhe-Öljei took warning and never returned home
again.
Like many parties, such as the Communist Party of China or the
Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in Northern Mongolia, the
PRPIM began as the amalgamation of several small groups, which
continued as factions within the party. Such cliqueism was especially
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persistent in Inner Mongolia, where it took

and cultural divisions within Inner Mongolia. At the same time,
these regions had closer economic ties with the neighboring Chinese
regions than with each other. The only common center of Inner Mon-

golian intellectual and political life was Beijing. Cities like Baotou or
Zhangjiakou could serve only as temporary centers - lacking any
major religious, educational, or governmental institutions their per-

manent ties were only local, with almost exclusively mercantile. Yet
the same could be said of the Chinese Communist base areas during
the period of the Soviet Republic (1931-1936). Here, too, the party
was territorially dispersed into small cells, based in border regions
which economically had closer ties with their Nationalist-controlled
respective regional centers than with each other. Likewise, the cradle
and long-term center of the party, Shanghai, was the enemy's strong-

hold as well. Why then were the cells and activists of the PRPIM
eventually absorbed into local organizations they had helped to
create, while the Communists were not?
It is here that the funeral of Öljeijirgal, described at the beginning
of this paper, takes on a greater significance. The PRPIM was not an

ideological party. Such aims as it had - destroying the warlords,
driving imperialism out of Inner Mongolia, implementing autonomy
and self-determination - related not to an eschatological world-view
but to the creation of an unified national organization. Believing in
the desirability of these policies did not result in any alienation from
local society or in holding any particular position on disputes within
that society. Nor did it necessarily result in any understanding or interest in world-wide events - the one published discussion by öljeijirgal of Japanese aggression in Inner Mongolia is of breath-taking
naïveté (Edünkheshig, et al. 1981: 285). The Buddhist world-view of
Öljeijirgal and the party members he recruited, was, despite a year of
study in Ulaanbaatar, little different from that of the more conscious
and articulate members of the local Üüshin banner society he had
left. For the Communists to participate in a religious ceremony, or a
secret society, was an act of insincerity, putting on the guise of a
member of local society, when in fact one was not. But for many of
the Mongols in PRPIM, their brief training could not make them
strangers to the village to which they would return, and to its worldview. They might well be willing to try to follow directives from the
party center, and, indeed, in documents as late as 1930, the Üüshin
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party committee was begging the Central Committee in Ulaanbaa
for some guidance. Deprived of it, they were unable on their own
follow a revolutionary policy.

The PRPIM's goals were primarily political: social and cultural
revolution did not play a part. Moreover the leaders displayed a persistent opportunism that prompted them to seek alliances with local
forces, a policy that led to rapid expansion of the party ranks at the
cost of discipline and uniformity. But without a gap of ideology between the activists and the society in which they moved, it seems unlikely that any policy could have, in the long run, avoided this inability
to keep the party and society distinct. Strikingly, where a revolutionary transformation of Mongolian society did succeed, it did so by fol-

lowing a great expansion in modern education that made of the gap
between the traditional and the modern a chasm. In the Mongolian
People's Republic, the military victory of 1921 did not produce a social revolution until the 1930s, when the secular-educated generation
came of age, while the social revolution in eastern Inner Mongolia in

1945-1947 followed the great expansion of modern education that
began with Japanese rule in 1931.
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